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ABSTRACT
As more and more applications and services depend on data
collected and provided by Internet of Things (IoT) devices, it
is of importance that such data can be trusted. Data prove-
nance solutions together with blockchain technology are
one way to make data more trustworthy. However, current
solutions do not address the heterogeneous nature of IoT
applications and their data.
In this work, we identify functional and non-functional
requirements for a generic IoT data provenance framework,
and conceptualise the framework as a layered architecture.
Using a proof-of-concept implementation based on Ethereum
smart contracts, data provenance can be realised for a wide
range of IoT use cases. Benefits of a generic framework in-
clude simplified adoption and a more rapid implementation
of data provenance for the IoT.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) is transforming many areas of
our everyday lives. IoT technologies such as GPS, RFID-based
identification, and low-resource computing platforms like
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the Raspberry Pi already play important roles in various do-
mains, e.g., mobility, logistics, healthcare, and retail [1]. Since
data collected by these technologies find application in an
increasing number of use cases, ensuring the trustworthiness
of such data is of high importance [2].
Data provenance systems are one way to ensure trustwor-
thiness in the IoT [3]. These systems can provide information
about the origin and evolution of data such as the various
stages of data creation and data modifications, who initiated
them, and when and how they took place [4]. In short, a data
provenance system tracks who has created, updated, deleted,
and in some cases read particular data points [4]. In order to
trust the information provided by a provenance system, it is
essential that the provenance system stores information in a
tamper-proof and replicable way [5].
Traditionally, in distributed settings, participants must
either trust each other or an independent third-party to store
data in a tamper-proof way. With the advent of blockchain
technologies, the requirement of such trust in a central au-
thority is eliminated. Instead, a decentralised network can be
established, acting as a distributed, tamper-proof ledger [6].
Thus, leveraging blockchain technology in a data provenance
solution for the IoT is a promising choice [6].
The IoT is characterised by a multitude of use cases and po-
tential application areas [1]. An IoT data provenance solution
has to account for this diversity [7]. However, approaches
aiming at scenario-agnostic blockchain-based data prove-
nance solutions for the IoT offer so far no concrete software
solutions [8, 9], and more concrete solutions to data prove-
nance in the IoT only focus on specific application areas,
for instance, supply chains [10–12], health monitoring sys-
tems [13], or digital forensics [14].
Hence, we propose a generic blockchain-based data prove-
nance framework for the IoT that can be applied to a variety
of use cases. The advantages of a generic framework are the
easier adoption of provenance concepts by new use cases and
the interoperability of applications that use the framework.
The contributions of this work are as follows:
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• We define functional and non-functional requirements for
a generic IoT data provenance framework.
• We conceptualize and implement an IoT data provenance
framework consisting of smart contracts using a generic
data model to provide provenance functionality for a wide
range of IoT use cases.
• We present an evaluation of the framework with regard
to the defined requirements using a proof-of-concept im-
plementation with Ethereum smart contracts.
Following, we briefly explain underlying concepts and
provide exemplary use case scenarios (Section 2), define the
requirements (Section 3), and explain the concepts, architec-
ture, and proof-of-concept implementation of our IoT data
provenance framework (Section 4). In Section 5, we evalu-
ate the framework with regard to the defined requirements.
Section 6 provides an overview of the related work. Finally,
Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 BACKGROUND & MOTIVATION
Data provenance, sometimes also known as lineage or pedi-
gree [15], identifies the derivation history of data [4]. While
originally used for works of art, data provenance is now rel-
evant in a wide range of use cases, since data provenance
mechanisms help to establish a certain level of trust in data by
providing information about its creation, access, and trans-
fer [4]. Provided provenance data is secured, forgery, alter-
ation or repudiation of data can be prevented [5]. Accord-
ingly, data provenance solutions can help to establish trust
in data in the IoT [2]. In the following, we describe two
exemplary use cases for data provenance in the IoT.
Vaccine Supply Chains. Immunisation programmes depend
on functional, end-to-end supply chains [16]. In all phases of
the supply chain—fromprocurement to last-mile distribution—
it is of significant importance that vaccines remain in a tem-
perature range of around 2–8 °C. Otherwise, vaccines lose
their effectiveness. An unbroken, temperature-controlled
link from producer to consumer is also referred to as the cold
chain [16]. In IoT-enabled cold chains, technologies such
as RFID, GPS and sensing technologies [1] track tempera-
tures, locations and other conditions of the vaccines. This
provenance data helps to establish confidence in the quality
of vaccines and exposes any weak links along the supply
chain. As mentioned in Section 1, an important requirement
for provenance systems is that recorded provenance infor-
mation is replicable and tamper-proof. Recent scandals1 of
vaccine counterfeiting have confirmed the urgency of these
requirements in vaccine supply chain systems. Hence, an
IoT-powered data provenance system based on blockchain
1https://www.securingindustry.com/pharmaceuticals/
massive-fake-vaccine-racket-busted-in-indonesia/s40/a2849/#.
WrylEtNuaL4
technology could provide benefits in vaccine supply chain
scenarios. In particular, it enables the backtracking of errors
in case of breakage of the cold chain, and it helps to build and
to keep trust in immunisation programmes by preventing
counterfeit vaccines from entering the supply chain.
Health Monitoring Systems. Health monitoring scenarios
are another application area where tamper-proof data prove-
nance records can provide additional trust in data [13]. In
such scenarios, sensors monitor health conditions of patients
such as a patient’s heart rate, blood pressure, etc. Combined
with a real-time analytics service, the sensor readings can be
used to notify relatives and health professionals in case of
medical emergencies, such as a heart attack. Ideally, the root
cause of such a notification is verifiable, i.e., it is possible to
trace back a notification to the individual sensor readings
which caused it. Otherwise, if the circumstances that led to
the emergency notification are unclear, the possibility that
the notification was caused by a malicious attack tampering
with the system cannot be excluded. Having tamper-proof
provenance data for a notification, such as information about
the individual sensor readings and analytics involved, en-
sures the reliability and accuracy of the system.
3 REQUIREMENTS
This section defines the functional and non-functional re-
quirements of a generic data provenance framework for the
IoT. Such a framework needs to record provenance informa-
tion for addressable data points, i.e., data that has a unique
ID [7]. In accordance with [4] and [7], we derive the func-
tional requirements (Req. 1–7) of our framework. Further, in
accordance with Hasan et al. [5], we define non-functional
requirements that need to be fulfilled by a tamper-proof data
provenance system for the IoT (Req. 8–11).
(1) Provenance Abstraction: The framework needs to provide
generic data provenance capturing, storing, and querying
functionality which can be adopted by provenance use
cases to map their specific requirements.
(2) High-level and Low-level Provenance: Provenance records
represent high-level as well as low-level data points. Low-
level data points stem from low-level devices such as
sensors. High-level data points do not have a single phys-
ical origin (such as a sensor reading) but represent more
abstract concepts, e.g., some physical object in a supply
chain or an analytics result based on multiple inputs.
(3) Completeness: A provenance record is complete if every
relevant action which has ever been performed on a data
point is gathered [5]. Here, relevance implies that some
actions can be neglected if they do not contribute to the
provenance information of a particular data point.
(4) Creation of Lineage: Provenance records for a data point
can be created based on the last provenance record for
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that same data point. This enables the creation of lineage.
For instance, the lineage of a data point representing
a physical good travelling along a supply chain can be
tracked by creating a new provenance record based on
the old one at each critical step of the supply chain.
(5) Derivation: A provenance record entails references to
the provenance records of the data points that led to
its creation. For instance, a provenance record for an
analytics result based on value readings from multiple
sensors must not only contain information about the
sensor values but must also be able to access provenance
information of those same values, such as location and
time of recording.
(6) Provenance for Modifications of Data Points: The frame-
work enables the tracking of the modification history of
a specific data point. For instance, if an analytics result
runs through multiple stages of different calculations, the
history of these calculations can be tracked.
(7) Parallel Provenance: Multiple provenance records for the
same data point can exist in parallel, e.g., one provenance
trace might track the ownership of a data point (e.g.,
ownership of a physical good), while another provenance
record is tracking the location of that same data point.
(8) Integrity: Integrity mandates that provenance records
cannot be manipulated or modified by an adversary in
any way. This is crucial for establishing trust in the data.
Without guaranteed integrity, clients can potentially re-
pudiate provenance records.
(9) Availability: Data can be accessed when needed.
(10) Privacy: Provenance records of IoT devices can contain
sensitive data, e.g., in a health monitoring system. It is
therefore vital to keep this data confidential, i.e., to pre-
vent access by unauthorised entities. In addition, even
when the data itself is kept confidential, malicious actors
might still be able to create user profiles by identifying
user-specific data patterns. Hence, traceability of prove-
nance data needs to be prevented to ensure user privacy.
(11) Scalability:A provenance system is required to have a rea-
sonable expenditure. Storing and accessing provenance
information must have a low overhead. Especially, even
though some IoT devices are resource-constrained, they
must not be excluded from participating in the prove-
nance framework. Further, applications in the IoT poten-
tially deal with massive amounts of data and very fre-
quent data updates which a provenance solution needs
to account for.
4 IOT DATA PROVENANCE FRAMEWORK
This section presents the proposed generic blockchain-based
data provenance framework for the IoT. As mentioned in Sec-
tion 1, the benefits of a generic framework are interoper-
ability between applications using the framework and the
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Figure 1: Data Provenance Framework Architecture
facilitated implementation of provenance concepts for new
IoT use cases. Figure 1 displays the core architecture of the
framework. It consists of three layers all embedded within a
blockchain smart contract platform. Each layer represents
a different level of abstraction with a diverse set of respon-
sibilities within the framework. The storage layer is pri-
marily concerned with low-level representation and storage
of provenance data, the generic provenance layer provides
general-purpose provenance functionality, while the specific
provenance layer can be modified by use cases to fine-tune
the framework to their specific requirements.
A proof-of-concept implementation of the framework based
on Ethereum smart contracts is available as open-source soft-
ware at Github2.
Data Model
Provenance information varies depending on the specific do-
main or application [7]. Since the IoT domain is characterised
by heterogeneous applications and a wide range of possible
use cases [1], there is a need for a generalised provenance
model suitable for IoT applications. As the underlying data
model, our framework utilises the data provenance model
by Olufowobi et al. [7] since their model is specifically de-
signed to address IoT provenance data. The model defines a
provenance record for some data point dp as follows:
prov : dp 7→⟨addr(dp), {prov(idp)|∀idp ∈ inputs(dp)},
context(dp)⟩
A provenance record prov(dp) for a data point dp consists
of a 3-tuple associating the address addr(dp) of dp (i.e., some
kind of ID) with the set of provenance records of the data
points that led to the creation of dp (i.e., inputs(dp)), and
a context context(dp). The context denotes information of
interest for provenance about the state of the IoT system, e.g.,
information about agents involved in the computation of the
data point, time and location, or the execution context. This
definition of provenance allows for the description of both
2https://github.com/msigwart/iotprovenance
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Listing 1: Storage Contract (Excerpt)
1 c o n t r a c t S t o r ag e {
2 s t r u c t ProvenanceRecord {
3 u i n t t oken Id ;
4 u i n t [ ] i npu tP rovenanc e I d s ;
5 s t r i n g c on t e x t ;
6 u i n t index ;
7 }
8 mapping ( u i n t −> ProvenanceRecord ) r e c o r d s ;
9 u i n t [ ] p rovenance Index ;
10 f u n c t i o n ge tP rovenance ( u i n t p rov Id )
11 p u b l i c view r e t u r n s ( u i n t token Id , . . . ) { . . . }
12 . . .
13 f u n c t i o n c r e a t eP rovenanc e ( u i n t provId , . . . )
14 i n t e r n a l r e t u r n s ( u i n t index ) { . . . }
15 . . .
16 }
creation and modification of data points. In the former case,
the set of input provenance records contains an empty set. In
the latter case, the set of input provenance records contains
the provenance record of the data point before modification,
i.e., prov(dp′) = ⟨addr(dp′), {prov(dp), ...}, context(dp′)⟩.
The described data provenance model combined with
blockchain technology builds the basis for our IoT data prove-
nance framework. This way, the framework can not only
represent provenance information for various IoT use cases,
but also provides integrity guarantees for the recorded data.
Storage Layer
This layer is responsible for the low-level storage of prove-
nance records. It contains the generic representation for
provenance records as defined by the data provenance model,
as well as basic functionality to create, retrieve, update, and
delete provenance records. Delete refers to the invalida-
tion of provenance records, since truly deleting data from a
blockchain is not possible. An invalidated provenance record
cannot be used as input for subsequent provenance records.
Listing 1 displays an excerpt of the smart contract imple-
menting this layer. The internal representation of provenance
records (Lines 2–7) closely resembles the model discussed
above with the field tokenId representing the ID of a data
point. However, not only are data points addressable, but
also the provenance records themselves. Addressable prove-
nance records allow the storage layer to manage provenance
records as a mapping from provenance IDs to provenance
records: addr(prov) 7→ prov where the function addr(prov)
represents the ID of a provenance record prov. The mapping
is implemented via the mapping keyword (Line 8).
The contract exposes an API for creating, retrieving, updat-
ing, and deleting (i.e., invalidating) provenance records. Note
that, while functionality for retrieving provenance records
is exposed publicly via the public keyword (Lines 10ff), func-
tionality for creating, updating, and deleting records is pro-
tected via the internal keyword (Lines 13ff). These functions
cannot be accessed publicly, but are accessible from inher-
iting contracts such as the contract representing the gene-
ric provenance layer. Read-functions are publicly accessible
since these functions do not alter the state of the contract.
Generic Provenance Layer
The generic provenance layer’s main purpose is to provide
general-purpose provenance functionality on top of the stor-
age layer, i.e., it provides features that are universally appli-
cable for a wide range of provenance use cases. The generic
provenance layer has the following responsibilities.
Ownership of Data Points. While blockchain technology
can guarantee the integrity of data provenance records once
those records have entered the system, mechanisms need to
be in place to ensure that the records that enter the system
are correct. As a first step, we aim to prevent the creation
of provenance records by arbitrary clients, i.e., if client A
generates some data point dp0, we want to make sure that
only client A (or any client authorised by client A) is able to
create provenance records for dp0. Thus, we introduce the
notion of ownership of data points. Each data point belongs
to a specific client of the system, and only the owner or a
client authorised by the owner can create provenance records
for it. If an unauthorised client tries to create a provenance
record for a data point, the system raises an error.
The notion of ownership is closely related to so-called
tokens, i.e., smart contracts deployed on a blockchain that
represent a kind of digital asset [17]. Our framework lever-
ages tokens to introduce ownership of data points. Each data
point is represented by a single token and a single token
identifies exactly one data point. This one-to-one mapping
allows us to identify the owner of a data point by identifying
the owner of a particular token.
Each token acts as an entry ticket to the provenance frame-
work. To create provenance records for a particular data
point, a client first has to become the owner or be approved
by the owner of the corresponding token. The prototype
uses the Ethereum token standard ERC7213 which defines a
common interface for non-fungible assets, for instance, func-
tions for transferring ownership. This has the advantage that
our tokens (i.e., the data points) can be traded by any client
implementing this standard, such as wallets or exchanges.
By transferring ownership, data points can pass from owner
to owner, leaving a trail of provenance records created by
each owner along the way. This is useful for implementing
provenance applications, e.g., in supply chain scenarios.
3https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/master/EIPS/eip-721.md
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Listing 2: Generic Provenance Contract (Excerpt)
1 c o n t r a c t Gener i cProvenance i s ERC721 , S t o r a g e {
2 . . .
3 mapping ( u i n t => u i n t [ ] ) i n t e r n a l a s s o c i a t e d P r o v ;
4 . . .
5 f u n c t i o n c r e a t eP rovenanc e ( u i n t token Id , . . . )
6 i n t e r n a l r e t u r n s ( u i n t index ) {
7 r e q u i r e ( e x i s t s ( t oken Id ) ) ;
8 r e q u i r e ( ownerOf ( t oken Id ) == msg . s ende r ) ;
9 checkVa l i dP rovenance ( inpu tP rovenance ) ;
10 u i n t p rov Id = g e t P r ov I d ( ) ;
11 addAssoc i a t edP rovenance ( token Id , p rov Id ) ;
12 r e t u r n super . c r e a t eP rovenanc e ( provId , . . . ) ;
13 }
14 . . .
Associating Provenance Records with Data Points. The ge-
neric provenance layer further links together data points
and their respective provenance records. The framework
provides information about associated provenance records
of specific data points. Within the generic provenance layer,
this is achieved by using a mapping from a data point ID to
a set of associated provenance IDs:
addr(dp) 7→ {addr(prov1(dp)), addr(prov2(dp)), ...}
All associated provenance records (prov1, prov2, etc.) repre-
sent parallel provenance traces for the same data point. Of
those records, each one represents a completely independent
trail of provenance information. For instance, one trail of
provenance records might trace the temperature history of
a physical good, while another one might trace its location.
Listing 2 displays an excerpt of the smart contract imple-
menting this layer and demonstrates the general workflow
for creating new provenance records. First, the contract ver-
ifies that a given token (i.e., data point) exists (Line 7) and
that the token belongs to the sender of the message (Line 8).
After validating the input provenance records (Line 9), the
contract creates a new provenance ID (Line 10), adds it to the
list of associated provenance (Line 11), and calls the storage
contract’s createProvenance function (Line 12). Note that the
createProvenance function of the generic contract is again in-
ternal, and thus not accessible publicly. This enables specific
provenance contracts which implement concrete use cases
to further adapt the functionality according to their needs.
Specific Provenance Layer
Smart contracts within this layer utilise the functionality pro-
vided by the generic provenance layer, but control a subset
of parameters by themselves. This way, use cases can cus-
tomise the provenance model according to their needs, and
control access to the functionality provided by the storage
Listing 3: Specific Provenance Contract (Example)
1 c o n t r a c t S p e c i f i c i s Gener i cProvenance {
2 f u n c t i o n reques tToken ( )
3 p u b l i c r e t u r n s ( u i n t t oken Id ) {
4 u i n t t oken Id = ge tToken Id ( ) ;
5 r e t u r n super . mint ( msg . sender , t oken Id ) ;
6 }
7 f u n c t i o n c r e a t eP rovenanc e ( u i n t token Id ,
8 s t r i n g l o c a t i o n , u i n t t empera ture , . . . )
9 p u b l i c r e t u r n s ( u i n t index ) {
10 s t r i n g c on t e x t = c r e a t eCon t e x t ( l o c a t i o n ,
11 tempera ture , . . . ) ;
12 r e t u r n super . c r e a t eP rovenanc e ( provId ,
13 con t ex t , . . . ) ;
14 }
15 . . .
and generic provenance layer. Listing 3 displays an excerpt
of an exemplary smart contract implementing this layer.
The provenance model can be customised by defining the
context parameter, so that it presents the provenance infor-
mation needed for a specific use case scenario. For instance,
in the case of vaccine supply chains, the context should con-
tain temperature and location information about individual
vaccines. Hence, a specific contract could define its own
createProvenance function that requires parameters like tem-
perature, and location (Lines 7ff) which are then combined
to form the context to be passed on to the createProvenance
function of the generic provenance contract (Lines 10ff).
Access control happens on two levels. First, a specific con-
tract defines which parts of the generic provenance layer’s
API are exposed. For instance, even though the generic prove-
nance layer could permit updating or deleting (i.e., invalidat-
ing) provenance records, this could be unwanted behaviour
in the specific use case at hand. In this case, the contract in
the specific provenance layer simply “hides” the functional-
ity, i.e., does not expose it publicly.
Second, access control is relevant for controlling the own-
ership of data points. Since data point ownership is the deci-
sive factor with regard to who can create provenance records
for which particular data points, contracts in the specific
provenance layer are responsible for actually assigning own-
ership, i.e., which tokens get assigned to which clients. For
simplicity, our prototype automatically assigns new tokens
to requesting clients (Lines 2ff). However, ultimately, the
most suitable approach is dictated by the specific use case
at hand. For instance, clients could purchase tokens. This
would keep the framework publicly available while reducing
the risk of spamming attacks since the acquisition of tokens
incurs financial cost. Another alternative is a white list of
authorised clients allowed to request new tokens. This way,
the list controls exactly who participates in the provenance
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system. However, the question arises who is responsible for
managing the white list of authorised clients.
5 EVALUATION
We evaluate the framework with regard to the functional
and non-functional requirements defined in Section 3. The
use cases defined in Section 2 act as basis for the evalua-
tion of Req. 1–3. In addition, we reason about the fulfilment
of Req. 4–7 in an exemplary fashion applying the use case
of vaccine supply chains. However, the scenario of vaccine
supply chains is merely used to provide a more descriptive
analysis. The information specific to the vaccine supply chain
can be substituted with data reflecting any other use case.
While the presented framework is blockchain-agnostic, the
non-functional requirements (Req. 8–11) are evaluated using
the proof-of-concept implementation. Experiments are per-
formed on the public Ethereum test networks Rinkeby4 and
Ropsten5. Rinkeby and Ropsten are chosen as test networks
since their average block times most closely resemble the
block times of the main Ethereum network.
Provenance Abstraction (Req. 1). The presented framework
consists of multiple abstraction layers. The storage layer is re-
sponsible for low-level storage of provenance records while
the generic provenance layer extends the storage layer’s func-
tionality with generic provenance features and enhanced ac-
cess control. The generic provenance layer can be extended
by use case-specific smart contracts controlling certain pa-
rameters of the application, e.g., by assigning ownership of
tokens, and/or by exposing or hiding parts of the generic
layer’s API. For instance, in the scenario of vaccine supply
chains, a specific provenance smart contract might give an
entity such as the World Health Organisation complete con-
trol over who is able to acquire tokens, e.g., only trusted
vaccine manufacturers. In the use case of health monitoring
systems, multiple approved manufacturers might have con-
trol over assigning ownership of data point IDs. Hence, we
conclude that the framework acts as a base abstraction which
can be extended to fulfil the needs of specific provenance
use cases. Thus, we regard Req. 1 as fulfilled.
High-level and Low-level Provenance (Req. 2). The frame-
work identifies each data point by its corresponding token.
As long as a unique token (i.e., ID) gets assigned to a data
point, provenance information for that data point can be
recorded. Hence, the framework does not pose any restric-
tions on the nature of the data point. It is possible to record
provenance information for high-level as well as low-level
data points. The context parameter of a provenance record
can be used to add any kind of information the user desires.
4https://rinkeby.etherscan.io/
5https://ropsten.etherscan.io/
In the use case of vaccine supply chains, provenance informa-
tion could not only be collected for the vaccines themselves,
but also for sensor readings along the supply chain, e.g., tem-
perature readings which document an uninterrupted cold
chain. Within health monitoring systems, the patients them-
selves might be represented by data points. The patients’
provenance traces are then augmented by provenance in-
formation from low-level data points deriving from medical
devices. Hence, we regard Req. 2 as fulfilled.
Completeness (Req. 3). The broad definition of the context
parameter allows the collection of all information necessary
for complete provenance tracking. The definition of com-
pleteness is largely dependent on the specific provenance use
case. In the example of vaccine supply chains, information re-
quired to prove the origin of vaccines and an uninterrupted
cold chain can be recorded. Regarding health monitoring
systems, we are able to record all information necessary to
provide reliable root cause information for medical emergen-
cies. Therefore, Req. 3 can also be regarded as fulfilled.
Creation of Lineage (Req. 4). As an example, we assume
that the manufacturer SaferVaccines Inc. produces a new vac-
cine vacc1. The freshly produced vaccine is packaged with
an RFID tag and assigned with a unique ID. A completely
new provenance record for the vaccine is created, such as
prov(vacc1)=⟨addr(vacc1), ∅, ⟨agent=operator1@SaferVaccines-
Inc, time=5am, ...⟩⟩. Vaccine vacc1 is loaded onto an air-
craft air1. An RFID reader at the factory gate scans the
vaccine and registers a new provenance record of the vac-
cine leaving the factory, such as prov(vacc1)′=⟨addr(vacc1),
{prov(vacc1)}, ⟨agent=rfid1@SaferVaccinesInc, time=5am, ...⟩⟩.
Shortly after, an RFID reader at the aircraft’s entrance reg-
isters the vaccine entering the aircraft, e.g., prov(vacc1)′′=
⟨addr(vacc1), {prov(vacc1)′}, ⟨agent=rfid1@air1, time=5am,
...⟩⟩. The provenance records prov(vacc1), prov(vacc1)′, and
prov(vacc1)′′ represent the lineage of the vaccine. This shows
exemplarily how the framework fulfils Req. 4.
Derivation (Req. 5). Continuing the example from Req. 4,
inside the aircraft, sensors constantly monitor the temper-
ature. There are three readings from a temperature sensor:
dp1 = 38◦F, dp2 = 45◦F, dp3 = 40◦F. The provenance records
are given as follows:
prov(dp1)=⟨addr(dp1), ∅, ⟨agent=sensor, time=7am, ...⟩⟩
prov(dp2)=⟨addr(dp2), ∅, ⟨agent=sensor, time=8am, ...⟩⟩
prov(dp3)=⟨addr(dp3), ∅, ⟨agent=sensor, time=9am, ...⟩⟩
A fourth data point dp4 is created by a software agent cal-
culating the average temperature, i.e., dp4 = (dp1 + dp2 +
dp3)/3 = 41◦F. This data point’s provenance record is defined
as prov(dp4)=⟨addr(dp4), {prov(dp1), prov(dp2), prov(dp3)},
⟨agent=averager@air1, time=10am, ...⟩⟩. Hence, the frame-
work allows for the creation of provenance records for data
points deriving from multiple other data points (Req. 5).
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Provenance for Modifications of Data Points (Req. 6). In
a further step, the calculated average temperature dp4 is
converted into a different unit: dp′4 = 5◦C (i.e., from Fahren-
heit to Celsius). The resulting provenance record looks like
prov(dp′4)=⟨addr(dp′4), {prov(dp4)}, ⟨agent=converter@air1,
time=11am, ...⟩⟩. Thus, the framework is also able to sup-
port the modification of data points (Req. 6).
Parallel Provenance (Req. 7). Besides measuring the temper-
ature inside the aircraft (air1), we might also want to track
the location of the aircraft at the same time. The framework
enables the creation of parallel provenance records since
each data point is mapped to a list of associated provenance
records (see Section 4). We can create one provenance record
provtemperature(air1) representing the latest temperature in-
side the aircraft, and one provenance record provlocation(air1)
representing the latest location of the aircraft. Hence, we
regard Req. 7 as fulfilled.
Integrity (Req. 8).The presented framework uses blockchain
technology to provide trustless and tamper-proof storage of
provenance records for IoT data. Thus, once records have
entered the system, the integrity of records depends on
the underlying blockchain technology. Ethereum is a public
blockchain with around 8250 fully validating nodes securing
the network at the time of writing6. Hence, we consider the
integrity requirement for data and computations on Ethe-
reum as fulfilled. However, the framework also needs to
provide mechanisms to ensure only correct records enter the
system in the first place. As a first step, we implement the
concept of ownership of data points using tokens to prevent
arbitrary clients from creating provenance records. In future
work, this concept could be further extended by mechanisms
that guarantee the correctness of the records themselves.
Availability (Req. 9). In public blockchain networks like
Ethereum potentially anyone can run a full node. Hence, we
consider the availability requirement as fulfilled.
Privacy (Req. 10). While the privacy requirements of a
provenance system largely depend on the concrete use case
at hand, in scenarios with sensitive data, such as a health
monitoring system, privacy is crucial [13]. However, pri-
vacy remains an ongoing challenge in the realm of (public)
blockchains, since a blockchain’s security relies on data being
transparent and verifiable by every participant. A blockchain-
based data provenance framework suffers from the same
problem. While some propose to use private blockchains in
scenarios where privacy is important [13], this is not suffi-
cient in scenarios which also depend on the system being
publicly available, such as global vaccine supply chains.
Scalability (Req. 11). Since IoT scenarios potentially deal
with massive amounts of data and frequent data updates,
626 July 2019 (https://ethernodes.org/network/1)
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Figure 2: Avg. Throughput for Creating Provenance Records
we evaluate the framework’s scalability with regard to la-
tency and transaction throughput. Latency and throughput
are mostly influenced by two factors, network load (how
many transactions are submitted to the blockchain) and gas
price (how much are the senders of the individual transac-
tions paying as fee). With a higher number of pending trans-
actions (i.e., higher network load), not every transaction can
be included within the next block of the blockchain which
means higher priced transactions get prioritised since block
validators earn more per each included transaction. As the
gas price is increased, the average latency converges to the
average block time (∼14-30 seconds) of the blockchain, since
higher-priced transactions are almost certainly includedwithin
the next block. To evaluate throughput, we submit up to
150 transactions to the test network during a 60 second
time frame. Afterwards, we divide the number of confirmed
transactions with the time frame of 60 seconds to calculate
the transactions per second (TPS). Fig. 2 shows the aver-
age transaction throughput of our experiments. The tradeoff
that blockchain-based systems make in terms of scalability
and security becomes clear with an average throughput of
only 1-1.6 TPS. Increasing the gas cost does not seem to im-
prove throughput beyond a certain point. Notably, through-
put was measured from a user perspective, i.e., transactions
were submitted from a single account. The maximum global
throughput of the Ethereum blockchain is roughly 20 TPS.
To sum up, the framework fulfils all functional require-
ments defined in Section 3. By leveraging blockchain tech-
nology, the non-functional requirements of integrity and
availability can be fulfilled. Regarding scalability and privacy,
the use of blockchain technology poses limitations. Through-
put and latency of the framework are constrained, and the
inherent transparency of blockchain technology naturally
presents a challenge for privacy-sensitive applications.
6 RELATEDWORK
As mentioned in Section 1, other works [8, 9] focus on pro-
viding generic blockchain-based data provenance solutions
for the IoT. However, these approaches remain conceptual
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with no provided implementation. In contrast, the framework
presented in the work at hand has been fully implemented
and is available as open-source software. Other solutions
related to blockchain-based data provenance in the realm of
the IoT go beyond conceptual approaches [10–14]. While the
approaches presented in [10–12] focus on securing prove-
nance information in supply chains, the works in [13] and
[14] focus on a blockchain-based patient monitoring system
to provide notifications in case of medical emergencies, and a
framework that tracks information about vehicles to resolve
disputes between drivers, insurance companies and main-
tenance server providers in case of accidents, respectively.
In general, these solutions demonstrate how provenance
concepts can be brought onto the blockchain (e.g., via smart
contracts). However in contrast to our work, though IoT tech-
nologies are addressed, these solutions are use case-specific
and do not provide a generic provenance framework that is
required for the heterogeneous nature of the IoT [1, 7].
Provenance in the supply chain has also received attention
in the industry. Startups like Provenance7 and Everledger8 fo-
cus on securely tracking goods traveling along a supply chain
via blockchain technology. However, their sole focus lies on
tracking physical items instead of any kind of data within
the IoT. Further, works have also focused on blockchain-
based data provenance solutions outside the IoT domain, e.g.,
blockchain-based data provenance for cloud environments
to verify the operation history of data in the cloud [18], or
in the scientific field where blockchain technology is used
to secure the derivation history of scientific data [19].
As can be seen by the discussion, to the best of our knowl-
edge, there is no other approach which provides a generic
framework for tracking data provenance in the IoT.
7 CONCLUSION
The presented framework provides a data provenance so-
lution which is appropriate for the heterogenous nature of
the IoT. By leveraging a generic data model together with
a layered architecture of smart contracts, the framework
is able to fulfil the functional requirements. By building on
blockchain technology, the framework further fulfils the non-
functional requirements of integrity and availability but has
some limitations regarding scalability and privacy. Multiple
current blockchain developments seek to overcome these
issues without jeopardising blockchain security, e.g., state
channels, zero-knowledge proofs, and sidechains [20]. Thus,
in future work, we will evaluate in detail to what extent
these approaches provide solutions to the privacy and scal-
ability problem in the context of blockchain-enhanced IoT
applications, such as our data provenance framework.
7https://www.provenance.org/
8https://www.everledger.io/
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The work presented in this paper has received funding from
Pantos GmbH within the TAST research project.
REFERENCES
[1] S. Li et al. “The internet of things: a survey”. In: Information Systems
Frontiers 17.2 (2015), pp. 243–259.
[2] M. N. Aman et al. “Secure Data Provenance for the Internet of
Things”. In: 3rd ACM International Workshop on IoT Privacy, Trust,
and Security. ACM, 2017, pp. 11–14.
[3] E. Bertino. “Data trustworthiness—approaches and research chal-
lenges”. In: Data privacy management, autonomous spontaneous se-
curity, and security assurance. Springer, 2014, pp. 17–25.
[4] J. Freire et al. “Provenance for computational tasks: A survey”. In:
Computing in Science & Engineering 10.3 (2008), pp. 11–21.
[5] R. Hasan et al. “Preventing history forgery with secure provenance”.
In: ACM Transactions on Storage 5.4 (2009). Article no. 12.
[6] K. Christidis et al. “Blockchains and smart contracts for the internet
of things”. In: IEEE Access 4 (2016), pp. 2292–2303.
[7] H. Olufowobi et al. “Data Provenance Model for Internet of Things
(IoT) Systems”. In: Service-Oriented Computing–ICSOC 2016 Work-
shops: Revised Selected Papers. Springer, 2017, pp. 85–91.
[8] G. C. Polyzos et al. “Blockchain-assisted information distribution
for the Internet of Things”. In: 2017 IEEE International Conference on
Information Reuse and Integration. IEEE, 2017, pp. 75–78.
[9] N. Baracaldo et al. “Securing Data Provenance in Internet of Things
(IoT) Systems”. In: Service-Oriented Computing–ICSOC 2016 Work-
shops: Revised Selected Papers. Springer, 2017, pp. 92–98.
[10] K. Toyoda et al. “A Novel Blockchain-Based Product Ownership Man-
agement System (POMS) for Anti-Counterfeits in The Post Supply
Chain”. In: IEEE Access 5 (2017), pp. 17465–17477.
[11] M. Westerkamp et al. “Blockchain-based Supply Chain Traceability:
Token Recipes model Manufacturing Processes”. In: IEEE Interna-
tional Conference on Blockchain. IEEE. 2018.
[12] H. Wu et al. “A distributed ledger for supply chain physical distribu-
tion visibility”. In: Information 8.4 (2017), 137:1–137:18.
[13] K. N. Griggs et al. “Healthcare blockchain system using smart con-
tracts for secure automated remote patient monitoring”. In: Journal
of Medical Systems 42.7 (2018), 130:1–130:7.
[14] M. Cebe et al. “Block4forensic: An integrated lightweight blockchain
framework for forensics applications of connected vehicles”. In: IEEE
Communications Magazine 56.10 (2018), pp. 50–57.
[15] Y. L. Simmhan et al. A survey of data provenance techniques. Tech. rep.
IUB-CS-TR618. Computer Science Department, Indiana University,
Bloomington, Indiana, USA, 2005.
[16] T. Comes et al. “Cold chains, interrupted: The use of technology and
information for decisions that keep humanitarian vaccines cool”. In:
Journal of Humanitarian Logistics and Supply Chain Management 8.1
(2018), pp. 49–69.
[17] Cryptographic Tokens. https://blockchainhub.net/tokens/. Accessed
29 May 2019. 2019.
[18] D. Tosh et al. “Data Provenance in the Cloud: A Blockchain-Based
Approach”. In: IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine 8.4 (2019), pp. 38–
44.
[19] A. Ramachandran et al. “SmartProvenance: ADistributed, Blockchain
Based DataProvenance System”. In: 8th ACM Conference on Data and
Application Security and Privacy. ACM, 2018, pp. 35–42.
[20] J. Eberhardt et al. “On orOff the Blockchain? Insights onOff-Chaining
Computation and Data”. In: 2017 European Conference on Service-
Oriented and Cloud Computing. Springer, 2017, pp. 3–15.
